Abstract: Using a stock-flow-fund ecological macroeconomic model, we analyse (i) the effects of climate change on financial stability and (ii) the financial and global warming implications of a green QE programme. Emphasis is placed on the impact of climate change damages on the price of financial assets and the financial position of firms and banks. The model is calibrated using global data and simulations are conducted for the period 2015-2115. Four key results arise. First, by destroying the capital of firms and reducing their profitability, climate change is likely to increase gradually their burden of debt, leading to a higher rate of default that could harm both the financial and the non-financial corporate sector. Second, climate change damages can lead to a portfolio reallocation that can cause a gradual decline in the price of corporate bonds. Third, financial instability might adversely affect credit expansion and the investment in green capital, with adverse feedback effects on climate change. Fourth, the implementation of a green QE programme can reduce climate-induced financial instability and restrict global warming. The effectiveness of the programme is higher the higher is the responsiveness of green investment to changes in bond yields.
Introduction
There is a growing concern that climate change is likely to have severe effects on the stability of the financial system. So far, most analyses have concentrated on the potential effects of climate change on the asset prices of fossil-fuel companies (see e.g. NEF, 2012; Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2015; McGlade and Ekins, 2015) and the performance of the insurance sector (see e.g. Bank of England, 2015) . Much less attention has been paid to the impact of climate change on financial stability as a result of its economic damages.
1 This impact is non-trivial and equally important.
First, the increase in temperature and the economic catastrophes caused by climate change could reduce the profitability of firms and could deteriorate their financial position. Accordingly, debt defaults could arise which would lead to systemic bank losses. Second, lower firm profitability combined with global warming-related damages can affect the confidence of investors, inducing a rise in liquidity preference and a fire sale of the financial assets issued by the corporate sector.
In this paper, we develop an ecological macroeconomic model that sheds light on these financial stability effects of climate change. The model builds on the stock-flow-fund model of Dafermos et al. (2017) which relies on a novel synthesis of the stock-flow consistent approach of Godley and Lavoie (2007) with the flow-fund model of Georgescu-Roegen (1971, ch. 9; 1979; 1984) . The model is calibrated using global data and simulations are presented which illustrate the effects of climate change on the financial system. Dietz et al. (2016) have recently investigated quantitatively certain implications of climate change for the financial sector. They use a standard Integrated Assessment model (IAM) and the climate value at risk (VAR) framework. Assuming that climate change can reduce the dividend payments of firms and, hence, the price of financial assets, they provide various estimates about the climateinduced loss in the value of financial assets. Our study moves beyond their analysis in three different ways. First, by relying on the stock-flow consistent approach, we portray explicitly the balance sheets and the financial flows in the financial sector. This allows us to model the climate-2 induced fragility that can be caused in the financial structures of firms and banks, a feature which is absent in Dietz et al. (2016) . Second, we utilise a multiple financial asset portfolio choice framework which permits an explicit analysis of the climate-induced effects on the demand of financial assets in a world of fundamental uncertainty. This allows us to capture the implications of a fire sale of certain financial assets. This is not explicitly considered in the model of Dietz et al. (2016) in which climate damages do not have diversified effects on different financial assets.
Third, the financial system in our model has a non-neutral impact on economic activity: credit availability and the price of financial assets affect economic growth and employment. Accordingly, the interactions between economic performance and financial (in)stability are explicitly taken into account. This is crucial since the feedback economic effects of bank losses and asset price deflation can exacerbate climate-induced financial instability (see Batten et al., 2016) . Dietz et al. (2016) utilise a neoclassical growth framework where long-run growth is independent of the financial structure of firms and banks. This leaves little room for the analysis of the macroeconomic implications of climate-induced financial problems.
Our simulation results illustrate that in a business as usual scenario climate change is likely to have important adverse effects on the default of firms, the leverage of banks and the price of financial assets. These affects are more pronounced towards the end of the 21st century and the beginning of the 22nd century. Remarkably, this climate-induced financial instability causes problems in the financing of green investment disrupting the transition to a low-carbon and more ecologically efficient economy.
An additional contribution of this paper is that it examines how monetary policy could reduce the risks imposed on the financial system by climate change. Drawing on the recent discussions about the potential use of monetary policy in tackling climate change (see e.g. Murphy and Hines, 2010; Werner, 2012; NEF, 2013; Rozenberg et al., 2013; Amin et al., 2014; Barkawi and Monnin, 2015; Campiglio, 2016) , we examine the extent to which a global green quantitative easing (QE) programme could ameliorate the financial distress caused by climate change. This programme involves the purchase of green corporate bonds. The simulations presented about the effects of a green QE programme are of growing relevance since in a world of climate change central banks might not be able to safeguard financial stability without using new unconventional tools in a prudential manner.
3 The paper's outline is as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the model and the key equations that capture the links between climate change, financial stability and monetary policy.
Section 3 describes the calibration and the validation of the model. Section 4 analyses our simulations about the effects of climate change on the financial system. Section 5 focuses on the impact of a green QE programme. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Our global model consists of two big blocks: (i) the 'ecosystem' block that encapsulates the carbon cycle, the interaction between temperature and carbon, the flows/stocks of energy and matter and the evolution of ecological efficiency indicators; (ii) the 'macroeconomy and financial system' block that includes the financial transactions, the balance sheet structure and the behaviour of households, firms, banks, central banks and the government sector.
Firms produce one type of material good which is used for durable consumption and investment purposes. The matter that is necessary in the production process is either extracted from the ground or comes from recycling the demolished/discarded socio-economic stock. 2 Energy is produced by using both renewable and non-renewable sources. Production results in CO2 emissions and waste. A distinction is made between green and conventional capital. The higher the use of green capital the lower the energy and material intensity and the higher the recycling rate and the use of renewables.
Firms invest in conventional and green capital by using retained profits, loans and bonds. Banks impose credit rationing on firm loans. This means that they play an active role in the determination of output and the accumulation of green capital. Households receive labour income, buy durable consumption goods and accumulate wealth in the form of deposits, corporate bonds and government securities. There are no household loans. Commercial banks accumulate capital and distribute part of their profits to households. Central banks determine the base interest rate, provide liquidity to the commercial banks and purchase government securities 2 The socio-economic stock includes capital goods and durable consumption goods.
4 and corporate bonds. Governments collect taxes and conduct fiscal policy. Inflation has been assumed away and, for simplicity, the price of goods is equal to unity. We use US dollar ($) as a reference currency.
The skeleton of the model is captured by four matrices:
(1) The physical flow matrix (Table 1) which portrays the inflows and the outflows of matter and energy that take place as a result of the production process. The First Law of Thermodynamics implies that energy and matter cannot be created or destroyed. This is reflected in the material and energy balance. (2) The physical stock-flow matrix (Table 2) which presents the dynamic change in material and non-renewable energy reserves, the atmospheric CO2 concentration, the socio-economic stock and the stock of hazardous waste. The first row of the matrix shows the stocks of the previous year. The last row presents the stocks at the end of the current year. Additions to stocks are denoted by a plus sign. Reductions of stocks are denoted by a minus sign.
5 (3) The transactions flow matrix (Table 3 ) which shows the transactions that take place between the various sectors of the economy. Inflows are denoted by a plus sign and outflows are denoted by a minus sign.
(4) The balance sheet matrix (Table 4) which includes the assets and the liabilities of the sectors.
We use a plus sign for the assets and a minus sign for the liabilities. Interest on deposits The model extends the model developed by Dafermos et al. (2017) by including a bond market, central banking, the government sector, the household portfolio choice and an endogenous rate of default for firms. In what follows we present the equations of the model that are more relevant for the interactions between climate change, financial stability and monetary policy. The full list of equations is reported in Appendix A. Additional details about the foundations of the model and the justification of the equations can be found in Dafermos et al. (2017) .
Emissions and climate change
The equations about emissions and climate change draw on the integrated assessment modelling (see Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013 
where  is the CO2 intensity, defined as the industrial emissions produced per unit of nonrenewable energy.
Every year land-use CO2 emissions ( L EMIS ) are also generated because of changes in the use of land (Eq. 2). These emissions are assumed to decline exogenously at a rate lr :
Total emissions ( EMIS ) are given by:
The carbon cycle, represented by Eqs. (4)-(6), shows that every year there is exchange of carbon between the atmosphere and the upper ocean/biosphere and between the upper ocean/biosphere and the lower ocean. In particular, we have: ). For simplicity, the radiative forcing due to non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions ( EX F ) is determined exogenously:
where fex is the annual increase in radiative forcing (since the pre-industrial period) due to non-CO2 agents.
As shown in Eq. (9), the rise in radiative forcing places upward pressures on the atmospheric temperature (
where S is the equilibrium climate sensitivity, i.e. the increase in equilibrium temperature due to doubling of CO2 concentration from pre-industrial levels.
The temperature of the lower oceans ( LO T ) is given by:
Green capital, energy intensity and renewable energy
Green capital allows firms to produce the same output with less energy. This is captured by the following logistic function: are, respectively, the maximum and the minimum potential values of energy intensity. As the ratio of green capital to conventional capital increases, energy intensity goes down. The use of the logistic function implies that the installation of green capital (relative to conventional capital) initially generates a slow improvement in energy intensity. However, as installation expands further, the improvement reaches a take-off point after which energy intensity improves much more rapidly due to the learning obtained from installation experience and the overall expansion of green capital infrastructure. Finally, as energy intensity approaches its potential minimum, improvement starts to slow.
A similar logistic function is used for the effects of green capital accumulation on the share of renewable energy in total energy produced ( ):
By definition, the maximum potential value of  is 1. Note that in Dafermos et al. (2017) the formulation of the links between green capital and ecological efficiency indicators is quite different since it does not rely on logistic functions. The use of logistic functions in the model presented here allows for a more realistic representation that takes into account the processes of learning-by-doing and learning-by-installation which play a key role in the diffusion of new technologies.
Output determination and damages
Eq. (13) shows our Leontief-type production function:
where * Y is the potential output. The potential output is the minimum of (i) the matterdetermined potential output ( 
T D is the proportional damage which lies between 0 (no damage) and 1 (complete catastrophe). Eq. (15) has been proposed by Weitzman (2012) . The variable T D enters into both (i) the determination of capital and labour and their productivities and (ii) the consumption and investment demand. In our baseline scenario we assume that
The financing of investment
Firms' investment is formalised as a two-stage process. At a first stage, firms decide their overall desired investment in both green and conventional capital. At a second stage, they allocate their desired investment between the two types of capital. Eq. (16) captures the first stage:
The desired investment ( D I ), adjusted for the damage effect, is given by net investment plus the depreciated capital;  is the depreciation rate of capital stock. Following the Kaleckian tradition (see e.g. Blecker, 2002) , net investment depends positively on the rate of (retained) profits ( r ) and the rate of capacity utilisation ( u ). Investment is also a function of the growth rate of energy intensity (  g ). This captures the rebound effect linked to the fact that firms invest more when energy intensity declines, since the energy cost goes down. This higher investment increases the use of energy, partially offsetting the positive effects of energy efficiency improvements. Eq. (19) shows that the proportion of green investment depends on three factors: 
, reflects the borrowing cost of investing in green capital relative to conventional capital. As the cost of borrowing of green capital (via bank lending or bonds) declines compared to conventional capital, firms tend to increase green investment.
Finally, we posit that climate change damages lead to more green investment since these damages induce firms to increase mitigation and might lead governments to adopt stricter regulation against the investment in conventional capital.
As mentioned above, retained profits are not in general sufficient to cover the desired investment expenditures. This means that firms need external finance, which is obtained via bonds and bank loans. It is assumed that firms first issue bonds and then demand new loans from banks in order to cover the rest amount of their desired expenditures. For simplicity, the long-term bonds issued by firms are never redeemed. The proportion of firms' desired investment which is funded via bonds is given by: We postulate a price-clearing mechanism in the bond market:
where C B and G B denote the value of conventional and green bonds held by households and central banks. Prices tend to increase whenever households and central banks hold a higher amount of corporate bonds in their portfolio. A rise in the price of bonds produces a decline in the bond yield, which has two effects on firms' investment. First, since firms pay a lower interest rate on bonds, their profitability improves increasing their desired investment. Second, a lower bond yield (which might result from a rise in bond prices) induces firms to increase the proportion of desired investment covered via bonds. This is crucial because firms need to rely less on bank lending in order to finance their investment. The disadvantage of bank lending is that, due to credit rationing, banks provide only a proportion of the loans demanded by firms. Accordingly, the less firms rely on bank loans in order to finance their desired investment the higher their ability to make their desired investment expenditures.
Based on firms' budget constraint, the new loans are determined as follows: (28) where L denotes the total loans of firms.
The rate of default ( def ) is a positive function of the lagged burden of debt of firms and a positive function of the lagged degree of credit rationing for green and conventional loans:
where bur is the burden of debt of firms, C CR is the degree of credit rationing for conventional loans, G CR is the degree of credit rationing for green loans and C sh is the share of conventional loans in total loans. The burden of debt expresses the financial commitments of firms relative to their profits. When the burden of debt of this sector increases, more firms are expected to face liquidity problems. Accordingly, at the aggregate level, a higher burden of debt translates into a higher rate of default. Additionally, firms' liquidity problems are assumed to increase when credit availability declines, that is when there is a rise in the proportion of new green loans and conventional loans that is credit rationed. A lower credit availability implies that more firms cannot attain their desired liquidity position. This is crucial because the liquidity created via new credit can be partially employed for the repayment of existing debt. Hence, the higher the unwillingness of banks to satisfy the demand for new corporate loans the higher the rate of default. 
The portfolio choice of households
Households' asset allocation is driven by three factors. The first factor is the global warming damages. We posit that damages affect households' confidence and increase the precautionary demand for more liquid and less risky assets (see Batten et al., 2016) . Since damages destroy capital and the profitability opportunities of firms, we assume that as T D increases, households reduce their holding of corporate conventional bonds and increase the proportion of their wealth held in deposits and government securities which are considered safer.
5 Second, asset allocation responds to alterations in the relative rates on return. The holding of each asset relies positively on its own rate of return and negatively on the other asset's rate of return. Third, a rise in the transactions demand for money (as a result of higher expected income) induces households to substitute deposits for other assets. 4 The parameters in the portfolio choice equations satisfy the horizontal, vertical and symmetry constraints. 5 It could be argued that the demand for green corporate bonds is also affected negatively by the climate change damages that harm firms' financial position. However, climate change damages might at the same time induce households to hold more green bonds in order to contribute to the restriction of global warming. Hence, the overall impact of damages on the demand of green bonds is ambiguous. For this reason, we have decided to assume 0 30  '  in our simulations. 6 Note that balance sheet restrictions require that Eq. (33n) must be replaced by Eq. (33) in the computer simulations.
The bank leverage ratio is defined as:
where B SEC is the government securities that banks hold, HPM is high-powered money and
is the capital of banks.
Central banks and green QE
Central banks determine the base interest rate, provide liquidity to commercial banks (via advances) and buy government securities (acting as residual purchasers). Moreover, in the context of QE programmes, they buy bonds issued by the firm sector. Currently, central banks do not explicitly distinguish between the holdings of conventional and green bonds. However, in order to analyse the implications of a green QE programme, we assume that central banks announce separately the amount of conventional bond and green bond purchases. The value of conventional corporate bonds held be central banks (
CCB B
) is:
where C s is the share of total outstanding conventional bonds that central banks desire to keep on their balance sheet. Currently, this share is very low since the corporate bond purchases of central banks represent a very small proportion of the total bond market.
The central banks' holdings of corporate green bonds ( GCB B ) are given by:
where C s is the share of total outstanding green bonds that central banks desire to keep on their balance sheet. We assume that this share is currently equal to zero since central banks do not implement green QE programmes.
Calibration and validation of the model
We have calibrated the model using global data. Parameter values (i) have been taken from other studies or determined based on the available data, (ii) have been calibrated such that the model generates the baseline scenario described below or (ii) have been selected from a reasonable range of values. The details are reported in Appendix B and Appendix C.
The model is simulated for the period 2015-2115. The aim of the simulations is to illuminate the long-run interactions between the financial system and climate change. Hence, no attention is paid to short-run fluctuations and business cycles. In the baseline scenario we assume that the economic expansion in the next decades is quite smooth: the economy grows at around 2.8-3% till 2050, as it has been observed on average over the last two decades or so. Drawing on the United Nations (2015) population projections (medium fertility variant), the labour force is assumed to grow at a declining rate, becoming equal to around 4.5bn people in 2050 (assuming a constant labour force-population ratio). The improvement in the ecological efficiency indicators is quite modest: for example, the share of renewable energy is increased to about 18% till 2050 (from about 14% which is the current level), while energy intensity is assumed to become approximately 30% lower in 2050 compared to its 2015 level. The improvement in ecological efficiency is associated with the accumulation of green capital. The cumulative green investment in the period 2015-2050 is equal to around US$35 trillion. Note that this figure includes both climate investment and other types of green investment that, for example, are conducive to lower material intensity and higher recycling rate. We also assume that in the baseline scenario the conventional bond market is relatively stable and the price of conventional bonds remains close to its current level till 2050.
We do not expect that the structure of the time series data in the next decades will necessarily be the same with the structure of past times series. However, it is a useful exercise to compare the auto-and cross-correlation structure of our simulated data with the real one in order to check whether the model produces data with reasonable time-series properties.
7 This is done in Fig. 1 . 
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The auto-correlation structure of our simulated data is similar to the auto-correlation structure of the real data. This is especially the case for the structure of our simulated output which looks remarkably close to the empirically observed structure. Moreover, simulated consumption and investment appear to be pro-cyclical, in tune with the empirical data, and their peak behaviour resembles the behaviour observed in the real data. These results suggest that our model generates data with empirically reasonable properties.
Climate change and financial stability
Fig. 2 summarises the main channels through which climate change and financial stability interact. (Fig. 3c ). This rise is driven both by the exponential increase in output ( Fig.   3a ) and the very slow improvement in the share of renewable energy in total energy (Fig 3b) .
Hence, CO2 concentration in the atmposphere increases, leading to severe global warming: as Fig.   3d indicates, in 2100 temperature becomes about 4 0 C higher than the pre-industrial levels. The rise in atmospheric temperature leads to climate change damages. Accordingly, the growth rate of output starts declining. This slowdown of economic activity becomes more intense after the mid of the 21st century. Declining economic growth harms the profitability of firms (Fig. 3e ) and leads to a gradual rise in firms' burden of debt (Fig. 3f ), which in turn increases the rate of default ( Fig.   3g ) and thereby the bank leverage (Fig. 3h) . The overall result is an increase in credit rationing which affects adversely the financing of investment. This slows down the investment in green capital, disrupting the transition to a low-carbon and more ecologically efficient economy.
20 Climate damages affect the liquidity preference of households. The destruction of capital and the decline in the profitability of firms induces a reallocation of household financial wealth from corporate bonds towards deposits and government securities, which are deemed much safer. This is shown in Fig. 3i . The result is a decline in the price of corporate conventional bonds in the last decades of our simulation period (Fig. 3j) . This is an example of a climate-induced asset price deflation. Remarkably, the price of green corporate bonds also falls in our baseline scenario (Fig.   3k ). However, the main reason behind this fall is not the decline in the demand for green bonds from households. This fall is primarily explained by the increase in the supply of green bonds since green investment continuously increases in our simulation period (Fig. 3l ).
Bond price deflation has negative effects on economic growth because it reduces both the wealthrelated consumption and the ability of firms to rely on the bond market in order to fund their desired investment. It also leads to less green investment which affects adversely the improvement in ecological efficiency. Table 5 .
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How does the baseline scenario change when key parameters are modified? Space limitations do not allow us to explore this question in detail. However, we conduct a sensitivity analysis that concentrates on the following set of parameters (see Table 5 ): (i) the sensitivity of the default rate to the burden of debt ( 1 def ); (ii) the sensitivity of credit rationing to the default rate ( 1 r and 1 l ) and bank leverage ( 2 r and 2 l ); (iii) the parameters of the portfolio choice that capture the sensitivity of the liquidity preference of households to the global warming damages ( As expected, the default rate increases (decreases) more when its sensitivity to the burden of debt is higher (lower) compared to the baseline (Fig. 3g) . The same holds for the bank leverage ratio.
( Fig. 3h) . Also, the price of green corporate bonds declines more rapidly when the portfolio choice of households is more responsive to climate change damages (Fig 3k) . Nonetheless, the effects of climate change on financial stability are overall qualitatively similar.
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Effects of a green QE programme
In this section we analyse how our results change when a green QE programme is implemented.
We suppose that in 2020 central banks around the globe announce that they will purchase 20% of the outstanding green bonds and they commit themselves that they will keep the same share of the green bond market over the next decades. In 2020 this translates into an amount equal to around US$180 billion. We also assume that the proportion of conventional corporate bonds held by central banks remains equal to its current level. (19) . The higher the value of 2  the more firms' green investment responds to a monetary policy-induced decline in the yield of green bonds. Consequently, in our simulations we consider a green QE scenario whereby 2  is equal to its baseline value and another green QE scenario in which a more optimistic value of 2  is assumed.
The effects of the green QE programme are portrayed in Fig. 4 . As Fig. 4k shows, green QE boosts the price of green corporate bonds. This has various positive implications for climate change and financial stability. Regarding climate change, the resulting reduction in the green bond yield leads to a lower cost of borrowing for firms and a lower reliance on bank lending. This increases overall investment, including green investment. More importantly, since the price of green bonds increases relative to the price of conventional bonds (Figs. 4j and 4k ), the share of desired green investment in total investment goes up (Fig. 4l) . As firms invest more in green capital, the use of renewable energy increases (Fig. 4b) . This leads to lower CO2 emissions and slower global warming from what would otherwise be the case. 
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It should, however, be pointed out that in our simulations green QE cannot by itself prevent a substantial rise in atmospheric temperature: even with the optimistic value of 2  , global warming is still higher than 3.5 0 C at the end of the century. There are two main channels through which the beneficial climate effects of a higher 2  are attenuated. First, a higher 2  is conducive to lower damages, allowing economic activity to expand more rapidly in the optimistic green QE scenario (Fig. 4a) . This higher economic activity places upward pressures on CO2 emissions. Second, lower damages provide less incentives for the materialisation of green investment projects. This is shown in Fig. 4l : over the last decades of the simulation period the share of desired green investment in total investment becoms higher when 2  has a lower value.
Regarding financial stability, green QE increases profitability and reduces the burden of debt, the default rate and the bank leverage compared with the baseline (Figs. 4e, 4f, 4g and 4h). These beneficial effects on financial stability stem from (i) the reduction in economic damages as a result of slower global warming and (ii) the lower reliance of firms' green investment on bank lending stability. A higher value of 2  reinforces generally the financial stability effects of green QE.
However, the rise in the price of green bonds is lower compared to the baseline green QE scenario (Fig. 4k) . The reason is that firms issue more green bonds in order to fund their higher desired green investment. For a given demand for green bonds, this tends to reduce the bond price.
Conclusion
The fundamental changes that are expected to take place in the climate system in the next decades are likely to have severe implications for the stability of the financial system. The purpose of this article was to analyse these implications by using a stock-flow-fund ecological macroeconomic model. Emphasis was placed on the effects of climate change damages on the financial position of firms and asset price deflation. The model was calibrated using global data and simulations were conducted for the period 2015-2115.
Our simulation analysis for the interactions between climate change and financial stability produced three key results. First, by destroying the capital of firms and reducing their profitability, 30 climate change is likely to increase gradually the burden of debt of firms, leading to a higher rate of default that could harm both the financial and the non-financial corporate sector. Second, the damages caused by climate change can lead to a portfolio reallocation that can cause a gradual decline in the price of corporate bonds. Third, financial instability might adversely affect credit expansion and the investment in green capital, with adverse feedback effects on climate change.
The sensitivity analysis illustrated that these results do not change qualitatively when key parameter values are modified. However, a deeper exploration of the parameter space of our model is necessary in order to get a more detailed insight into the links between climate change and finance.
The article also investigated how a green QE programme could reduce the risks imposed on the financial system by climate change. The simulation results showed that, by increasing the price of green corporate bonds, the implementation of a green QE programme can reduce climateinduced financial instability and restrict global warming. However, green QE does not turn out to be by itself capable of preventing a substantial reduction in atmospheric temperature. Even with an optimistic assumption about the sensitivity of green investment to the divergence between the green bond yield and the conventional bond yield, global warming is still quite severe. Hence, many other types of environmental policies need to be implemented in conjunction with a green QE programme in order to keep atmospheric temperature close to 2 0 C and prevent climateinduced financial instability. 
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1 1 1 1 1             G G C C G G C C G b coupon b coupon K L int L int wN Y TP  (A52) 36 F G T TP TP   (A53) 1   TP s RP F (A54) RP TP DP   (A55) K RP r  (A56)      1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 1             T D D K K g u r I       (A57)         T T T T re re u u ue ue um um              1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 00 0      (D D G I I   (A63) D G D D C I I I   (A64)        1 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1              T C G L C G L D yield yield sh int int sh      (A65) ) 1 ( 0 1 0 0    g    (A66)   2 1 0 0 1       g g (A67) G G G G D G D G b p K repL RP I NL           1 1 (A68)   C C C C D C D C b p K repL RP I NL            1 1 1 (A69)   1 1 1          G G G G G G G defL b p K L L RP I    (A70)     DL b p b p I K L L L L RP I C C G G G G G C C C                 1 1 1 (A71) G C I I I   (A72) G C L L L   (A73) 1 1      G G G G K I K K  (A74) 1 1      C C C C K I K K  (A75) G C K K K   (A76) K / K G   (A77)    1 0 0 1 1      TF K D ad    (A78)       1 1 1 1 1       TP P v D ad g v v (A79) 1 2 1 0     Y g g     (A80)   3 1 0 0 1       (A81)       1 1 1 1 1       TP P D ad g    (A82) h s w W   (A83)  h Y N  (A84) re ur   1 (A85) C D C C C p I x b b 1 1    (A86) G D G G G p I x b b 2 1    (A87) C yield x x x 11 10 1   (A88) G yield x x x 21 20 2   (A89) C C C p coupon yield  (A90) G G G p coupon yield  (A91) 37 CCB CH C B B B   (A92) GCB GH G B B B   (A93) C C C b B p  (A94) G G G b B p  (A95) G C B B B   (A96)     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1                   G G C C G G C C G G C C G G C C b coupon b coupon L int L int TP b coupon b coupon L rep int L rep int bur (A97) 1   defL DL (A98)     1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1           G C C C CR sh CR sh def bur def def def (A99)
Households
1 1 1 1            GH G CH C H S D D HG b coupon b coupon SEC int D int BP DP wN Y (A100) H HG H T Y Y   (A101)    1 1 2 1 1 1       T HF H D V c Y c C (A102) G GH C CH H HF HF p b p b C Y V V   1 1 1         (A103) 1 1 15 14 1 13 1 12 11 1 10 10 1              HF H D G C S T HF H V Y int yield yield int D ' V SEC        (A104) 1 1 25 24 1 23 1 22 21 1 20 20 1              HF H D G C S T HF CH V Y int yield yield int D ' V B        (A105) 1 1 35 34 1 33 1 32 31 1 30 30 1              HF H D G C S T HF GH V Y int yield yield int D ' V B        (A106) 1 1 45 44 1 43 1 42 41 1 40 40 1              HF H D G C S T HF V Y int yield yield int D ' V D        (A107n) GH G CH C H H b p b p SEC C Y D D          1 (A107) C CH CH p B b  (A108) G GH GH p B b  (A109) 1 1      DC C DC DC  (A110)       1 1 1 1 1       TF LF LF D ad g LF LF (A111) 1 3 1 2 1 0       hazratio lf ur lf lf lf g LF (A112)   4 1 0 0 1     lf lf (A113)
Banks
1 1 1 1 1           A int D int SEC int L int L int BP A D B S G G C C (A114) D A SEC HPM L L K B G C B       (A115) 1   BP s BP B U (A116) U D BP BP BP   (A117) D h HPM 1  (A118) D h SEC B 2  (A119) U B C G BP D DL SEC L L HPM A A               1 (A120) 38 1 2 1 1 0      B lev r def r r CRC (A121) 1 2 1 1 0      B lev l def l l CRG (A122)   1 1 1 1         C C D C C C C defL repL NL CR L L (A123)   1 1 1 1         G G D G G G G defL repL NL CR L L (A124)   B B G C B K HPM SEC L L lev     (A125)
Government sector
CBP SEC int T G SEC SEC S        1 1 (A126) 1   govY G (A127) 1   G H H T   (A128) 1   G F F TP T  (A129) F H T T T   (A130)
Central banks
Oxygen used for the combustion of fossil fuels (Gt) 26. Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with recycling rate 4.39 Calibrated such that initial μ corresponds to initial κ and μ (2050)=0.9μ (2015) in line with the baseline scenario π 4 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with recycling rate 40.65 Calibrated such that initial μ corresponds to initial κ and μ (2050)=0.9μ (2015) in line with the baseline scenario π 5 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with energy inetnsity 6.79 Calibrated such that initial ε corresponds to initial κ and ε (2050)=0.7ε (2015) in line with the baseline scenario π 6 Parameter linking the green capital-conventional capital ratio with energy inetnsity 64.70 Calibrated such that initial ε corresponds to initial κ and ε (2050)=0.7ε (2015) Transfer coefficient for carbon from the atmosphere to the atmosphere 0.9817 Calculated from the formula φ 11 =1-φ 12 (see Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013) φ 12 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the atmosphere to the upper ocean/biosphere 0.0183 Taken from Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013) ; has been adjusted to reflect a 1-year time step φ 21 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the upper ocean/biosphere to the atmosphere 0.0080 Calculated from the formula φ 21 =φ 12 (CO2 AT-PRE /CO2 UP-PRE ) (see Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013) φ 22 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the upper ocean/biosphere to the upper ocean/biosphere 0.9915 Calculated from the formula φ 22 =1-φ 21 -φ 23 (see Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013) φ 23 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the upper ocean/biosphere to the lower ocean 0.0005 Taken from Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013) ; has been adjusted to reflect a 1-year time step φ 32 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the lower ocean to the upper ocean/biosphere 0.0001 Calculated from the formula φ 32 =φ 23 (CO2 UP-PRE /CO2 LO-PRE ) (see Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013 ) φ 33 Transfer coefficient for carbon from the lower ocean to the lower ocean 0.9999 Calculated from the formula φ 33 =1-φ 32 (see Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013) 
